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IN THE SUPREME COURT
O,F THE STATE O,F UTAH
La \TAR F. REESE and
D;\YID REESE, by and through
his Guardian AdLitem, LaVar
F. Reese,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

Case No.

v.

12372

GEORGE PROCTOR,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF O,F AP'PELLANT
N A'TURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for personal injuries and property
damage arising out of a collision between the plaintiff,
David Reese, riding his bicycle and the defendant,
Proctor, driving his automobile.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury. From a verdict and
judgment for the plaintiffs the defendant appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendant seeks reversal of the judgment
against him and a new trial.
1

S1T'ATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 5, 1969, at about 7 :15 p.m. m the
daylight, the plaintiff, David Reese, a 15 year old retarded boy, was riding his bicycle to a store in the
Cottonwood Heights Shopping area to get some milk
for his mother. David was familiar with the way. He
rode his bicycle from his home on DeVille Drive through
a stop sign and into the path of the defendant's vehicle
- on David's right - traveling west on 7000 South
Street (R. 191). In this area 7000 South Street is an
arterial street running east and west; it is generally
straight and level. The roadway is marked for one lane
of traffic in each direction. DeVille Drive, out of which
David Reese rode his bicycle, is a stop street that dead
ends at 7000 South.
1

At the south edge of 7000 South there is drain gutter
running east and west along the edge of 7000 South
and abutting against the north end of De Ville Drive.
The posted speed on 7000 South Street was 40 miles
per hour. Mr. Proctor, the defendant, was traveling
west in the center of the westbound roadway at approximately 35 miles an hour (R. 200). This speed was
confirmed by Officer Weldon Conger, the investigating
officer (R. 184), and also Officer C. D. Throckmorton,
plaintiff's expert witness (R. 354).
Mr. Proctor was coming from a grocery store a block
away and was approximately 50 feet east of the crosswalk shown on Exhibit 1-P when he first observed David.
David was then at the drain gutter at the south edge of
2

7000 Sou11 approximately 40 feet from the point where
the impact eventually occurred. (R. 191-92). He was
riding his bicycle at a constant speed at a slight angle
off the perpendicular to 7000 South. The point of impact
as deterimned by Officer Conger is marked by a circled
X on Exhibit 1-P.
David's speed was estimated by Mr. Proctor at
between 10 and 20 miles per hour (R. 194). His first
assumption on seeing David was that David would turn
left and use the traffic-free eastbound portion of 7000
South (R. 196). Upon seeing David he let up on the
accelerator (R. 195). When Mr. Proctor first became
aware David was intending to come on across the
street he hit his brakes (R. 200). He described letting off
the accelerator, glancing in the rear view mirror and
hitting the brakes to be almost simultaneous (R. 217).
Mr. Proctor further testified that even at the time he hit
his brakes he still assumed David would turn left into
the safe lane (R.196).
1

A neighbor and friend of the plaintiff's family, Mr.
Gary Bywater, stated he saw David ride into the street
and judged David's speed at 5 miles per hour (R. 224).
Even though Mr. Bywater, was standing along the route
taken by the defendant, he did not observe the defendant's vehicle before the collision or watch David to see
if David would stop. Offict>r Conger fixed the point of
impact as approximately 14 feet 2 inches south of the
north curb of 7000 South and 19 feet 6 inches west of
the prolongation of the east curb of DeVille Drive (R.
170). He found skid marks that were straight ood level
3

The defendant's car laid down approximately 31 feet
of skid marks on the front wheels prior to the impact
point (R. 1173).
According to plaintiff's expert, Officer Throckmorton, at 35 miles an hour the defendant was traveling
51.2 feet per second ( R. 362). Officer Throckmorton
also calculated using reaction time of % of a second
that l\Ir. Proctor traveled 38 feet during the reaction
time period (R. 364).
On Exhibit 1-P the plaintiff's counsel had Officer
Throckmorton count back from the point of impact 1,
2, 3, ± and 5 seconds and indicate the approximate point
that David Reese would have been at each second before
impact assuming David's speed to have been five miles
per hour. The officer then indicated by red marks the
approximate point that the defendant's automobile would
have been at each second back assuming a speed of 35
m.p.h. before reaction or braking. Officer Throckmorton 's calculations show that approximately 1 second
hefore the impact David Reese was at the centPr lim
of 7000 South. The calculations then show at 2 seconds
before impact David was toward the center of the eastbound roadway and that 3 seconds before impad he was
well in the middle of the eastbound roadway. The calculations of Officer Throckmo1ion also sho-w that l\Ir.
Proctor had only 2.75 seconds at the most from the time
he first saw David until the automobile reached the
•'point of escape."
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Plaintiff's (•ounsel n•quested and the court gave
Instruetion ?\ o. 3:2 whieh \n1s the verbatim .JIFU instrncon last dear chance as regards inattentiw plaintiffs.
ln aixuing the case to the jury, Plaintiff's counsel,
nsing the testimony of Officer Throckmorton, the
on Exhibit 1-P and the last clear chance
inc;trndion, a1·gued that David Reese was in a position
of dangn wlH•n fir:-;t observed some fl.75 seconds before
tl1P <'ollision and that the defendant could have stopped
1\l'i(·e in the distance inrnlvecl. Counsel further argued
to tlH' jury, urnkr the instruction given, that :Mr. Proctor
wns :z:n frpt a\rn.'- 5 seconds before impact, 199 feet away
+ s"concl:-;
impact, 130 fret a\rny 3 seconds before
impact and that by the time David was out in the middle
of tlw eastbound roafhrny l\[r. Proctor had not even
start<>d to react to stop. He stated at 2 seconds before
impact David was almost to the center line but that it
1rnuld not hav<> helped then bc·cause Mr. Proctor's autornoliile eould not avoid th<' acrident in 2 seconds or less

Plaintiff's eounsel argued that David vrns totally
inattt>ntivt> and the last clear chance doctrine applied
lwcause Mr. Proctor first :-;aw David at the drain gutter
and did not see David look in his direction until almost
the momPnt of impact. As there were no obstructions
Davicl could have looked and seen l\fr. Proctor before
nnssing the drain gutter. Because there ·was no traffic
in the eastbound portion of the roadway l\Ir. Proctor
assumed David "·ould turn left using the eastbound
Jiortinn of the road\\·a.'- and not continue on across.
5

David had been trained to stop at stop signs (R
341-42). After the accident he admitted to his father
he did not stop or look both ways before he rode into
the street (R. 219).
1

ARGUMENT
THE GIVING OF INSTRUCTION NO. 32 ON
LAST CLEAR CHANCE WAS PREJUDICIAL
ERROR UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.

By virtue of a pretrial order plaintiffs were allowed
to amend their original complaint to include the theory
of last clear chance (R. 41).
The last clear chance doctrine was given at trial as
Instruction No. 32 which is the same as JIFU instruction
17.20.
It is one of two JIFU instructions on last clear
chance. It is for an inattentive plaintiff whereas JIFU
instruction 17.21 is for a plaintiff in "helpless peril" more commonly referred to as inextricable peril.

The facts clearly show that David Reese was not in
a position of inextricable peril. Plaintiffs' case was
founded in making David out to be an "inattentive plaintiff" - as the select on of JIFU 17.20 as opposed to
17.21 shows. The instruction states:
Under certain circumstances a plaintiff is
entitled to a verdict against a defendant even
though the plaintiff be guilty of contributory
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negligence. This rule of law that thus permits
a negligent plaintiff to recover judgment is
known as the doctrine of last clear chance. If
you determine that David or !LaVar Reese were
in fact guilty of contributory negligence you
should then consider whether or not the doctrine
of last clear chance is applicable to this case.
The doctrine is applicable only if you find from
a preponderance of the evidence that each of the
following six propositions is true:

1. T'hat David Reese was in a position of
danger.
2. That David Reese was, by reason of
inattention or lack of proper alertness, totally
unaware of the peril that threatened him.

3. That George Proctor actually saw David
Ree·se and knew of his perilous position.
4. That George Proctor then realized or by
the exercise of due care should have realized
that David Reese was unaware of the danger to
himself.

5. That at the time George Proctor saw
David Re ese and knew of the peril to him and
realized or should have realized that David
Reese was oblivious to the danger, he then had
a clear opportunity to avoid the aooident by the
exercise of ordinary care and with his then
existing ability. There must have been an actual
opportunity existing at that moment for George
Proctor to avoid the accident. Also, it must have
been 1a fair, clear opportunity and not just a bare
possibility of doing so.
1

6. That George Proctor then negligently failed
to avail himself of that clear opportunity and as
a proximate result the plaintiff, David Reese,
was injured.
7

If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that each of the above six propositions is
true, the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable
to this case, and David Reese and LaVar Reese
are entitled to a verdict, even though you find
both or either guilty of contributory negligence.
If you find that any one of the above six propositions is not true, the doctrine of last clear
chance has no application and cannot be invoked
by David Reese.
One of this court's most recent discussions of the
doctrine of last clear chance is Donohue v. Rolando, 16
Utah 2d 294, 400 P.2d 12 (1965). The Donohu.e case very
clearly set forth basic principles for the application of
the last clear chance doctrine. The doctrine is humanitarian; no person can justifiably injure another where
he has a clear opportunity to avoid doing so.
"The doctrine implies thought, appreciation,
mental direction and lapse of sufficient time to
effectually act upon the impulse to save another
from injury." 400 P.2d at 15
The court in Donohue further explained the need
to understand the defendant's knowledge and the state
of plaintiff's condition.
It is first essential to determine whether plaintiff's
negligence continues up to the moment of injury or
whether such negligence has come to rest while leaving
p}aintiff in a perilous position from which he cannot
extricate himself.
If plaintiff's negligence is continuous up to the
moment of injury, the defendant, to be liable, must have
8

actual knowledge of the peril and a clear opportunity
to avoid the harm.

If plaintiff's negligence has come to rest but left him
in a position of extricable peril, defendant can be liable
for injuries to plaintiff if defendant should have known
of plaintiff's peril.

In applying these rules Donohue held that the last
clear chance doctrine was not proper where the plaintiff
could have, up to the moment of collision, turned his
bicycle onto the safe portion of the road shoulder.
In the present matter it is undisputed that David
Reese rode his bike through a stop sign onto a main
arterial road and into the path of defendant's automobile. It is undisputed that David Reese could have easily
seen defendant's car and avoided any injury by turning
his bicycle into the traffic-free eastbound lane of traffic.
Indeed, because he could have turned into the traffic-free
eastbound lane on 7000 South, David was in no danger
until he chose to continue into defendant's lane.

In Laidlaw v. Barker, 78 Idaho 67, 297 P.2d 287
(1956), an action was brought for the death of a 13 year
old boy struck by an automobile in a 60 mile zone when
he attempted to cross the highway without looking. The
court held the doctrine of last clear chance to be inapplicable because visibility of the defendant's apprO'aching
automobile was unobstructed and the plaintiff had a
clear chance to avoid the aocident.
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There is a presumption of law that one acts, or will
act, out of the instinct for self-preservation, in a manner
so as to avoid injury to himself. Mr. Proctor had every
right to assume that David Reese would therefore keep
his bicycle in the safe traffic lane and not pull in front
of his car.
"The defendant is entitled to assume that
the plaintiff is paying or will pa:v reasonable
attention to his surroundings ... " Van Wagoner
v. Union Pacific, 112 Utah 189, 186 P.2d 293, 302
(1947).

1

At trial plainiff called an expt>rt accident reconstruction witness - Police Officer C. D. Throckmorton.
Using David Reese's speed of 5 m.p.h. as testified to
previously by Mr. Bywater (R. 224), Mr. Throckmorton
marked Exhibit 1-P to show David's approximate
posistion at each of five seconds prior to impact. See
Exhibit 1-P.
1

It can be clearly seen from the exhibit that David
was only one second from impact when he first entered
into a dangerous situation - crossing into Mr. Reese's
lane of traffic. Prior to the one second mark David was
in no danger because he was in a traffic-free portion of
the road. At the slow 5 m.p.h. spe0d emphasized by
plaintiff's counsel David could have easily pulled into
the safe portion of the road and out of Mr. Proctor's
lane.

Three seconds prior to impact David had not even
reached the midway portion of the safe eastbound lane.
It is not uncommon for a driver to encounter automobiles,
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pedestrians, or bicyclists pulling onto the highway and
waiting for traffic to clear in the opposite lane before
proceeding on across. See Hickok v. Skinner, 113 Utah
1, 190 P.2d 514 (1948).

A large portion of Officer Throckmorton's testimony
was directed towards showing how many times defendant
could have stopped from the moment David was first
observed. This type of an argument is improper and
misleading because the jury can be thus led to believe
the defendant had a duty to stop prior to the moment
the law declares his duty begins. It is crucial in a last
clear chance case that defendant's duty continually be
related to specific points in time and plaintiff's situation
at each specific moment.
In Berton r. Cochran, 81 Cal. App. 2d 776, 185 P.2d
349 (1947), a boy on a bicycle emerged from a private
driveway and was struck when he pulled into the path
of a motorist. The court rejected plaintiff's argument
for last clear chance based upon the number of times the
defendant could have stopped from the moment he first
saw the boy. It was emphasized that the legal inquiry
must be to the moment when the emergency actually
arose, and because the doctrine presupposes time for
effective action it is not applicable where the emergency
is so sudden that there is no time to avoid the collision.
Under any view of the facts Mr. Proctor only had
mere seconds to re act to David's situation. Clearly, when
he first saw David there was no imminently dangerous
situation. To allow Mr. Proctor a clear last chance to
1
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avoid the accidl'nt considl'ration 11rn::;t he givPn to stopping distance, reaction time, and judg11wnt fom•. It cannot be said that the chance 1\f r. Proctor may have had to
avoid the accident \Vas a clear chance or the last chance.
Many counts have held that the instruction on last
clear chance should not be given in a case• involving a
collision of moving vehirks when• th<> act creating the
peril occurs practically simultaneously with the happening of the accident. See 2 California Jury 1'nstrnctio11s
616 (1956) and cases cited thereat.
In this case there is no doubt but what David Reese
could have avoided colliding with l\fr. Proctor's car up
to the very 1110ment of impad. Heean:-;e tlw bic)-(•le was
moving at a much slower rate of speed than defendant's
automobile the bike could have been maneuvered more
easily and quickly than the automobill'. In such a
situation the last clear chance doctrine should not be
applied. Defendant respectfully suggests this court
adopt the standard expressed in Niday v. Tomasini, 2-±0
Ore. 589, 403 P .2d 704, 706 ( 1965) :
"Where, as in this case, each driver is in
contrnl of a vehiclP which is moving and ('acl1
driver has an opportunity to avoid colliding with
the other, it would be pure speculation as to who
had the last cfoarr chance to avoid the collision.
"One driver cannot say, 'We were both
negligent in the control of our vehicles, but you
alone ar<-' responsible hecausP I drov(• to the point
of collision before you did and you should have
missed me.'
"The rule of law is well settled in this state
that concurrent nPgligence of a plaintiff contin-
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uing up to the time of injury bars recovery under
the doctrine of last clear chance." (Emphasis
added.)
Defendant suggests that the only safe and equitable
way to avoid t,riving the jury such a chance to speculate
is to require the trial court to first determine there is
suustantial evidence of a last and clear chance to avoid
injury; simply allowing the case before the jury on some
invites error.
The events leading to this accident occurred within
a very few seconds. Three seconds prior to the moment
of impact plaintiff was not even midway into the s afe,
traffic-free eastbound lane. He had plenty of time and
::;pace to avoid injury. At this same moment however Mr.
Proctor was at the point of no escape - he could not
have avoided striking David.
1

The most libPral view of the fact::; in favor of plaintiff would give Mr. Proctor only an additional 2.75
seconds prior to the point of escape. Each additional
second however only put David in a much safer position
less likely to cause any reasonable man to believe he
would ignore a clear avenue of saf ety.
1

Even during these 2.75 seconds David was not in
danger and therefore Mr. Proctor had no duty even
umfor a last clear chance theory to immediately take
evasive action.
EYen assuming a duty, for the sake of argument, a
period of time between zero and 2.75 seconds cannot
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reasonably be said to constitute a clear chance for one
to avoid the accident.
". . . evidence only permits one or two seconds
for the train crew to have taken the necessary
steps to have prevented the accident. This is not
giving the defendant the last clear chance. The
opportunity to avoid the accident must not be a
possibility; it must be a dear opportunity." Vain

Wagoner v. Union Pacific R. Co., 114 Utah 262,

186 P.2d 293, 302 (1948).

Giving any weight at all to the contrary evidence
that David was going as fast as 10-20 m.p.h. reduces Mr.
Proctor's 2.75 seconds to somewhere between a mere
fraction of a second and 2.75. In any light this was too
much hair splitting to allow the jury to speculate whether
Mr. Proctor had the last and a clear chance to avoid the
accident.

CONCLUSION
The judgment in favor of the plaintiffs should be
reversed because the court committed prejudicial error
in submitting the case to the jury under the last clear
chance doctrine for the following reasons:
(a) David's negligence was continuing and concurring negligeil'ce.
(b) David was not in a position of danger until
he crossed into the westbound portion of the
roadway.
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(c) Until David crossed into the westbound portion of the roadway he had the same or a
greater opportunity and chance as the
defendant to avoid a collision and after
crossing into Mr. Proctor's lane neither had
tt chance to avoid the collision.
( d) The plaintiff failed to show that the defendant had a clear and fair opportunity of avoiding the collision after it became obvious
David Reese was not going to stay in the
eastbound portion of the roadway.
Respectfully submitted,
Raymond M. Berry
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISIT'ENSEN
Seventh Floor Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Appellant
MAILING NOTICE
I hereby certify I mailed two copies of the foregoing
brief, postage prepaid, to Robert M. McDonald, 800
Walker Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this
···---·-··--------·---·-·-------·-··--·day of March, 1971.
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